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Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) schemes are an underdeveloped component of
the policy mix for catchment management in many countries. The importance of
intermediaries to such schemes is acknowledged in the literature but few studies go beyond
theory to evaluate practice. This paper analyses generic intermediary functions for PES. It
then evaluates an innovative example from southwest England that provides illustrations,
and some lessons regarding necessary capabilities and characteristics for intermediaries,
and understanding of their form, functions and modalities. The ‘UpStream Thinking’
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project was co-developed by a private water company and an environmental charity. The
former translated effective demand from shareholders and water customers for improved
raw water quality into ﬁnance, whilst the latter had capabilities for catchment-scale
on-farm delivery and trusted acceptance as an intermediary. While any sector can poten-
tially provide a PES intermediary, the value driven, not-for-proﬁt and politically neutral
voluntary sector proves to be a good ﬁt. Such ‘boundary organisations’ are also well placed
for horizontal coordination of catchment management authorities and actions.
Keywords: Intermediary; catchment management; payment for ecosystem services; NGOs;
transaction costs; social capital.
Introduction: Catchment Management Challenges and Payments
for Ecosystem Services
Water pollution, over abstraction and ﬂood risk are linked problems requiring
coordinated solutions. As public policy challenges they evolve over time as both
their outcomes and society’s preferences are inﬂuenced by economic development
and other social and environmental change. Solutions for these problems depend
in large part on how land and urban infrastructure are used and managed. Cog-
nisant of implications for habitats, biodiversity, local economy and human well-
being, this forms the agenda for integrated catchment management (ICM).
In England, more than 15 years since enactment of the Water Framework Di-
rective (WFD; CEC, 2000), there remains concern that less than 20% of rivers are
judged to be in ‘good health’ in meeting the set objectives (BBC, 2015; Environ-
ment Agency, 2015). The WFD has been heralded as far-sighted, innovative, and a
potential template for future environmental regulations (e.g. Voulvoulis et al.,
2017). However, the persistence of pollution and degraded ecology in many rivers
and lakes, plus growing demand to mitigate worsening ﬂood risk anticipated with
climate change (EFRA, 2016), conﬁrm that the challenges of ICM are both difﬁcult
andmulti-dimensional. Hence, it can be argued that they are beyond the scope, remit
and competency of any single agency or policy approach. Given its complexity and
diverse legitimate stakeholder values, ICM can be characterised as a ‘wicked
problem’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) that exhibits both technical and societal un-
certainty (Smith and Porter, 2010). This, and observation of successful ICM pro-
grammes, prompts assertion that analytic-deliberative, adaptive and collaborative
strategies are required; i.e. those that engage partner agencies and stakeholders, and
facilitate local deliberation of priorities and iterative actions, informed by evidence
(Smith et al., 2015). Within this context this paper focuses in particular on control of
rural non-point source (diffuse) water pollution.
A combination of approaches well adapted to local conditions is needed to cost-
effectively mitigate rural diffuse water pollution (Smith et al., 2017). This includes
H. Cook, L. Couldrick & L. Smith
May 2, 2017 10:31:12am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-2
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
‘baseline’ regulation, advisory and education campaigns, economic incentives
based on voluntary agreements and for exceptional cases direct land management
strategies based on acquisition or prescribed change or restriction of use. Once such
a policy framework is envisioned, adaptive strategies can follow. Building a col-
laborative approach based on partnership working between authorities, agencies and
stakeholder representatives is an essential preliminary phase (USEPA, 2008; Smith
et al., 2015). Relevant to this collaborative, polycentric and adaptive management
approach, this paper analyses and illustrates the role of intermediary actors.
Schemes characterisable as Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) are rel-
atively underdeveloped as a component of the policy mix as currently employed in
England1 and most other EU member states.2 The cross-compliance and greening
rules3 of the Basic Payments Scheme (BPS) funded under the EU Common Ag-
ricultural Policy (CAP) do require measures for public, land, animal and envi-
ronmental health, but only limited basic measures are speciﬁed to protect
watercourses and groundwater against pollution, soil erosion and over abstraction.
For such ICM objectives, payments offered in England by the ‘Mid-Tier’ of the
Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme4 (funded under the rural development
policy of the CAP) can incentivise measures to reduce water pollution through
farmer selection of relevant management options and items eligible for capital
grants.5 However, the scope of measures and targeting for ICM are poorly de-
veloped to date (Smith et al., 2017). First, because CS scheme regional priority
statements6 inadequately prioritise water quality protection as compared to land-
scape heritage and biodiversity conservation (Defra and The Rivers Trust, 2012).
Second, because farmers have generally not considered the payments for water
1This paper primarily considers England rather than the UK because of increasing devolution of
environmental policy and resulting differences in Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland (NB the UK
referendum result of 23rd June 2016 prompts UK withdrawal from the EU).
2 In contrast PES schemes in developing economies include those for forest environmental services,
carbon sequestration, biodiversity, landscape protection and watershed services (Landell-Mills and
Porras, 2002). These examples suggest both that PES can contribute to ICM and that catchments are
appropriate units within which to link ES providers and beneﬁciaries, and develop markets for ES
(Smith et al., 2006).
3Since 2015, farmers with land above set thresholds have to meet ‘greening’ rules to receive a
‘greening payment’ of about 30% of their total BPS payment. There is little direct provision for water
resources, although riparian buffer strips can qualify under a requirement for ‘ecological focus areas’
(RPA, 2016).
4Known as ‘Environmental Stewardship’ prior to January 2016.
5Although ‘water quality grants’ are only available in speciﬁed priority catchments (Smith et al.,
2017).
6As set out in regional statements of priorities (Gov.UK, 2016).
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pollution mitigation measures sufﬁcient to offset the income foregone, particularly
for partial or full land parcel retirement7 (Smith et al., 2017).
Thus, subject to demand for ecosystem services (ES) and ability to pay, there is
potential for greater use of PES for mitigation of rural diffuse water pollution and
other ICM objectives. A very wide range8 of candidate measures includes con-
version of arable land to low input grassland or permanent woodland, in ﬁeld and
riparian buffer strips, artiﬁcial wetlands, winter cover crops, fencing of water-
courses, ditch management, alleviation of soil compaction and temporary ﬂood-
water storage on farmland.
PES schemes need to align the interests of landowners and other groups in
society that beneﬁt from ecosystem service provision. They are based on voluntary
transactions in which provision of a deﬁned environmental (or ES), but most often a
land use or management measure providing the service, is paid for by one or more
ES buyer from one or more ES provider (adapted from Wunder, 2005). PES thus
develops mechanisms to capture environmental externalities and develop market-
based transactions to account for them. Such a voluntary ‘provider is paid’
mechanism can be complementary to, and synergistic with, ‘polluter pays’ (regu-
latory) and ‘producer saves, (advice driven and voluntary) mechanisms (Smith
et al., 2017). For example, effective ‘baseline’ regulation facilitates identiﬁcation of
the ‘additionality’ of environmental improvement beyond expected ‘good farming
practice’ that may merit PES payments, whilst advice provision can facilitate
compliance with regulation and adoption of voluntary and incentivised measures.
Narrow deﬁnitions of PES concern periodic payments made to ES providers
ideally matched to the opportunity cost of provision and conditional on delivery
(Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008). However, few existing schemes match these
conditions, and given the technical and operational demands aiming to do so may
not make practical sense (Perrot-Maître, 2006). Many contemporary initiatives
adopt a broader conception and scope (Salzman, 2009; Muradian et al., 2010). For
example, prior evidence-based determination of a causal relationship between land
use practice and ecosystem enhancement is often lacking or uncertain, and few
schemes demonstrate rigorous conditionality for payment based on monitored
service delivery. In practice payments are often given for farm infrastructure
improvements, and/or adoption of management practices, rather than for
7Typically, they have been able to qualify for the CS scheme by adopting lower opportunity cost
measures for other environmental objectives (with marginal if any beneﬁt to water protection).
8For example, Newell Price et al. (2011), provide an inventory of 83 diffuse pollution mitigation
methods, ranging across change in land use, crop and livestock husbandry, ﬁeld and farmyard
infrastructure improvements, management of manures, and use of improved genetic resources in
livestock.
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ecosystem service outputs, albeit based on some evidence that these will likely be
produced. This broader and more ﬂexible conception of PES is relevant to the
challenges of ICM, and its acceptance is suggested by policy guidance and case
studies published in England and elsewhere (e.g. URS-Scott Wilson, 2011; Smith
et al., 2013).
Typically, the form and provisions of a PES scheme vary according to what is
being targeted (e.g. water quality, ﬂood mitigation, carbon sequestration, habitat
conservation) and the needs of stakeholders and beneﬁciaries. Table 1 summarises
PES scheme terminology and variants. Of most relevance to this paper are input-
based payments to land managers by beneﬁciaries via one or more intermediary
for a bundle of ecosystem services; a combination in bold font in the table, and
with reference to second column rows numbered as type 2–3–2. Schemes of this
type are rare in Europe9 (Perrot-Maître, 2006), as environmental pollution is
usually controlled by a statutory agency. Similarly in the UK,10 which has tended
to rely on state agencies for monitoring and regulation of the water environment,
whilst both Natural England and the Environment Agency (EA) have generally
deferred from active establishment of PES schemes beyond the CS Scheme
Table 1. A typology of payments for ecosystem services schemes.
PES schemes can vary by: Form taken:
Services provided (1) One speciﬁc service
(2) Bundle of services
Financing arrangements (1) Payment to land managers administered by government
with or without an intermediary and sourced from tax-
payers (and/or development assistance in the case of less
developed economies)
(2) Payment to land managers administered by government
with or without an intermediary and ﬁnanced by bene-
ﬁciaries of ecosystem services
(3) Payment to land managers by beneﬁciaries of
ecosystem services usually via an intermediary
Basis for payment and monitoring (1) Output-based, payment by results
(2) Input-based, e.g. for a speciﬁed land use or manage-
ment
Source: The authors.
9More examples occur in developing countries, although most commonly of type 2–1–2 (Table 1),
with NGOs engaged in scheme design and as implementing intermediaries (Porras et al., 2008).
10Also types 1–3–1 and 1–3–2 in Table 1.
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(type 2–1–2). Hence, there are as yet few examples of mature type 2–3–2 schemes
where speciﬁcally there is an intermediary acting between ES providers and
buyers.11 This begs the question: who is tasked with potential fulﬁlment of
demand for ecosystem services from the private sector and civil society?
The importance of intermediaries to PES schemes is often mentioned but there
are few published studies that go beyond theoretical considerations to detail their
practice and functions, or evaluate their effectiveness (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013;
Pham et al., 2010; Bosselmann and Lund, 2013). Also, most such studies are
derived from examples in developing economies where scheme actors and oper-
ation may be affected by income, capacity and other developmental constraints and
priorities. The contributions of this paper are a generic review and assessment of
the intermediary functions needed for PES schemes (particularly those of type 2–
3–2 in Table 1), and evaluation of a case study from southwest England against
the resulting conceptual framework to identify necessary capabilities and char-
acteristics for an effective intermediary organisation in this context. An evaluation
of an innovative developed economy case can contribute to understanding of the
emergence, form, functions and modalities of PES intermediaries, and of wider
enabling factors in that context.
The methodology employed has comprised a literature review to synthesise
lessons from existing examples and to form a conceptual framework for assess-
ment of PES intermediary roles and functions. Evaluation of the case study in
England was conducted through observation of the development and operation of
the scheme over an extended period, including in-depth, semi-structured inter-
views with selected principals in the organisations involved. Employing a simple
and small ‘n’ form of stratiﬁed purposive sampling (Patton, 1990; Strauss and
Corbin, 1998), respondents from four perspectives were interviewed: ES provi-
ders, intermediary, ES buyer, and relevant statutory agency personnel including
observers, facilitators and regulators relevant to the scheme.12 The remainder of
the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 generically deﬁnes and conceptualises
intermediaries and Sec. 3 identiﬁes their speciﬁc roles and activities. Section 4
11Despite promotion by government (e.g. Dunn, 2011) the few contemporary examples that exist
can be considered as ‘work in progress’. Sixteen ‘pilot’ schemes were listed by the Ecosystems
Knowledge Network, 2016. These included: water quality in the Fowey River in Cornwall, ﬂood
control and biodiversity and landscape enhancement for Kingston-upon-Hull, and harbour water
quality for Poole Harbour in Dorset.
12Consisting respectively of: Six farm visits/interviews; repeated interviews (three occasions) with
four intermediary personnel; repeated interviews (three occasions) with a senior manager from the
ES buyer; and six interviews with statutory agency personnel.
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describes the case study and Sec. 5 evaluates this and seeks to draw generalisable
lessons and policy relevant conclusions.
Understanding Intermediaries
Arguably an intermediary is not an essential requirement for a PES scheme in so
far as it could simply involve a one-to-one transaction between two actors; for
example, an upstream landowner and a downstream water user. In reality, this is
unlikely to be feasible in practical terms or at acceptable cost for the downstream
buyer as the number of upstream land users to be transacted with increases.
Typically, the ES buyer will lack the knowledge and capabilities to be able to
transact cost effectively at scale. Thus, in simple terms PES intermediaries can be
deﬁned as those actors performing functions that facilitate transactions between
buyers and providers of ecosystem services. Such deﬁnition focuses on the roles
that intermediaries perform and does not limit the type, characteristics or scale of
the organisation concerned. Public, private, civil society and research organisa-
tions, collaborative groups and individuals can all potentially act as PES
intermediaries, and may span scales from the local to regional, national and even
transnational (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013).
A generalised conception of the role of an intermediary can be drawn from
principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Arrow, 1991). Accordingly,
purchases of ecosystem services can be understood as delegations of authority
from principals to agents established by contracts and rewarded by payments.
Adverse selection, the challenge for the principal of selecting an appropriate agent,
and moral hazard, the challenge for the principal of assuring the conduct of an
agent, both stem from asymmetries in information regarding agents and their
behaviour, and create uncertainty for the outcomes of contracting. Solutions re-
quire monitoring and potential use of penalties (withdrawn incentives). An in-
termediary acts as an agent serving principals on both sides of the PES transaction
to address both challenges (Guston, 2001). Success for the intermediary depends
on the behaviour of the principals on either side, both of whom rely on the
intermediary for information. The intermediary will satisfy both parties to a
contract by reducing the uncertainty of their outcomes and by remaining stable and
resilient in the face of conﬂicts between principals and/or external shocks. Given
that the intended outcomes of a PES scheme will generally be public beneﬁts in the
form of enhanced environmental goods and ecosystem services (and often socio-
economic goals such as poverty reduction in a developing economy context), it
can be assumed that the successful intermediary will be acting in the public good.
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
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Within the wider context of a polycentric approach to ICM, policy solutions can
be expected to emerge when actors agree and cooperate under a set of institutions
governing collaboration that can similarly be considered as forms of contract
(Sabatier et al., 2005; Benson et al., 2013). According to institutional rational
choice theories collective action agreements emerge from the interaction of utility-
maximising individuals (or organisations) that seek to minimise their costs
(Ostrom, 1999; Benson et al., 2013), and an intermediary can facilitate such
interaction and cost minimisation. Researchers can seek to show how observed
patterns of actor behaviour, interaction and outcomes are determined by the
characteristics and constraints of the action arena and its actors (Ostrom, 1990,
1999). Recognition and analysis of the roles and importance of PES intermediaries
can thus be attempted with reference to at least two established theoretical
frameworks.
It is useful to supplement this with perspectives drawn from the recent literature
on ‘boundary organisations’. Studies of how science-policy interfaces can be
enhanced have been prompted by observations that specialisation of personnel
within public administration, allied to separations between policy makers,
researchers and local knowledge, limit interaction and collaboration. Attention
focuses on the individuals, organisations and mechanisms that can facilitate
communication and interaction across boundaries, and counter undue risk aversion
by policy makers and managers when faced with uncertainty (Agrawala et al.,
2001; Guston, 2001; Boissin, 2009; Lidskog, 2014). Like a PES intermediary
between two principals, a boundary organisation is expected to facilitate infor-
mation ﬂows and interaction, whilst remaining accountable to both research and
policy actors (Boissin, 2009).
The concept of ‘boundary work’ is increasingly being used in a broader sense
with reference to boundaries arising for research, policy and practice in environ-
mental management. For example, Mollinga (2013), emphasises that there is no
scarcity of boundaries to cross in addressing the complex systemic challenges of
water resource protection and management; whilst Cash (2001), reports that
boundary work was instrumental for initiating, continuing and mediating rela-
tionships between science and policy for agricultural extension work addressing
aquifer management in the USA. Such boundary work incorporates three key
elements: concepts, objects and the setting within which to employ them
(Mollinga, 2013; Cash et al., 2003; Crona and Parker, 2012).
The development of ‘boundary concepts’ facilitates a shared vision, concepts,
ways of thinking and approaches. For example, ‘sustainable development’ and
‘integrated water resources management’ are concepts that have served to unite
varied constituencies in common purpose, and boundary organisations use such
H. Cook, L. Couldrick & L. Smith
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concepts to deﬁne and communicate a problem and its scale, to negotiate
boundaries and to mediate information ﬂows (Cash, 2001).
‘Boundary objects’ are devices and methods that enable assessment, planning
and action despite continued uncertainty, complexities and conﬂicts (Star and
Griesemer, 1989). Examples include conceptual models, computer models,
visualisations, classiﬁcation systems and other representations and decision sup-
port tools that enable varied actors to interact and coordinate despite continuing
divergent perceptions, interests or values. A boundary object needs to be sufﬁ-
ciently intelligible, ﬂexible, robust and concerning of mutual interests that all
actors can accept it as a common reference point (Lidskog, 2014). The best will be
‘portable’ in so far that they may be used in different social settings and by varied
stakeholders for development of policies and plans that are both scientiﬁc evi-
dence-based and context-sensitive. This requires information, processes and out-
comes that are salient, i.e. relevant, timely and accurate for each stakeholder, and
legitimate, i.e. having broad-based acceptance (Cash et al., 2003); noting that
people are more likely to trust what they co-produce rather than what is delivered
solely by experts. Portable boundary objects can thus inﬂuence how a problem is
understood, resources made available for its management, and the solutions
adopted (Lidskog, 2014).
The ‘boundary setting’ concerns the organisational and institutional arrange-
ments that enable boundary concepts and objects to be employed. For example,
development and facilitation of fora in which stakeholders can meet for knowledge
exchange and joint assessment and planning activities. Another important task for
a boundary organisation may then be facilitation of data access via a shared
repository for primary research, public and partner organisation data sets, and
collective outputs. Such data compilation enabling analyses not possible from any
one data set is an example of the potential synergies achievable from collaboration.
Despite the richness as points of reference of the theory and concepts sum-
marised here, what appears to be less well considered, at least speciﬁcally in the
PES literature, is the role of an intermediary as a co-innovator and initiator of
change. Also, how over the time the intermediary may adaptively evolve both the
innovation it is co-responsible for and its delivery, in order to best achieve the
changes and outcomes desired.
Roles for PES Intermediaries
Table 2 presents a synthesis of overarching roles, associated aims and key
functions or activities for PES scheme intermediaries. Five overarching roles
are identiﬁed: (A) scoping and scheme design, (B) scheme administration,
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
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(C) representation and mediation, (D) knowledge generation and exchange, and (E)
building social capital and trust; and from four to twelve functions for each role.
A PES scheme will establish transactions where none previously existed.
Hence, the ‘commodity to be traded’, potential providers, potential buyers, details
of the contract and the price must all be deﬁned to set up the scheme and com-
mence transactions.13 The ability of the intermediary to act on behalf of the
buyer(s) to ﬁnd ES providers who are eligible, able and willing to participate is
central. Capacities required may include technical capabilities for feasibility as-
sessment and for spatial planning and targeting. In principle, the designers of a
scheme should also seek to achieve budgetary allocative efﬁciency by matching
payments to the opportunity cost of ES provision for each provider. This may
prompt use of payment allocation mechanisms such as ‘reverse auctions’, although
as noted below associated administrative complexity and transaction costs need to
be managed. Hence, an intermediary’s knowledge of the location, land use sys-
tems and farming population may substitute for this, and as noted above, payments
in practice are often more simply determined. Further to this, in a wider context of
ICM, and with the assumption that solutions can be best co-developed with local
stakeholders, it becomes essential that diverse interest groups — for example,
farmers, anglers, rural communities and local government — are engaged (Cook
and Inman, 2012). As in other comparable public good and common property
resource problems, the role of the intermediary is to facilitate and support tech-
nically the analytic-deliberative and adaptive process that may adopt a PES
scheme as part of a package of solutions.
Continuing scheme administration will require the allocation of budget, making
of payments, and oversight of contracts. For the latter, monitoring of agreed ES (or
land use) provision and enforcement of contracts may pose challenges. Both in-
ternal scheme conditions and external inﬂuences will also change dynamically
creating potential need to re-negotiate, implement and monitor revised or new
agreements with ES providers. As noted with reference to theoretical frameworks
above, a key aspect of both scheme design and operation is the need to minimise
transaction costs. Considered generically, these are the costs incurred in deﬁning,
establishing, maintaining and transferring property rights (McCann et al., 2005).
Considered broadly, here they may include all the costs associated with scheme
design, operation and associated activities (corresponding to the functions listed in
Table 2), bar the actual payments for ES provision. Subject to bounded rationality,
13Exceptionally an intermediary could also act as a ‘wholesaler’, i.e. a purchaser of ES from
providers and a seller to varied buyers (potentially pooling demand from local and international
sources for single or bundled ES; NB: this will require capacity to accept signiﬁcant ﬁnancial risk).
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if transaction costs exceed expected beneﬁts, actors will not participate in the
process. Conversely, where transaction costs are high, for example, because of
asymmetries in information and a lack of trust between transacting parties, insti-
tutional rational choice theory predicts that partnerships provide the potential for
lower cost solutions (Benson et al., 2013). Intermediaries that facilitate both
transactions between ES providers and buyers and wider partnership working, thus
have a crucial ﬁnancial role in relation to the aggregate costs of the management
processes and delivery mechanisms of a scheme.
In a PES scheme, transaction costs will be inﬂuenced by the speciﬁcity of
ecosystem services desired, the uncertainty of outcomes that ES buyers will ac-
cept, the frequency of transactions (Rørstad et al., 2007), and intermediary and ES
provider characteristics. ES speciﬁcity may affect costs for empirical veriﬁcation
of provision (and where necessary additionality). For example, veriﬁcation that a
parcel of land has been reforested should cost less than veriﬁcation that a set of
prescribed farming practices are adopted across the same area. Being willing to
accept some uncertainty in such veriﬁcation will also tend to reduce transaction
costs for an intermediary and ES buyer, for example, by enabling use of a lower
cost proxy measure or sampling strategy. Frequent transactions and automated
payments may incur lower transaction costs per trade or unit of ES provision if
standardisation of procedures and some economies of scale can be achieved
(Kemkes et al., 2010). A PES scheme for ICM objectives may require repeated
transactions and hence familiarity between intermediary and ES providers may
similarly reduce transaction costs. Gintis et al. (2003), also emphasise the ‘self-
policing force’ and transaction cost reducing potential of mutually valued recip-
rocal relationships and trust, and that central to this is perception by land users that
ES payments are a reward for a service valued by society rather than a ‘bribe’ to
correct behaviour. The corresponding sense of worth may lower risk of moral
hazard (breach of contract) and reduce costs of monitoring and enforcement. The
ability of an intermediary to engage in partnerships again also becomes central as
collaboration with ‘competent authorities’ responsible for regulation and envi-
ronmental monitoring can reduce scheme costs. A locally well-established inter-
mediary may also be able to reduce scheme development costs by ‘piggy-backing’
new PES agreements on existing engagement with land users (Bosselmann and
Lund, 2013).
With regard to other ES provider characteristics, many PES transaction costs
may be independent of land holding scale whereas the payment for the ecosystem
service itself is likely to be positively associated with the area concerned (par-
ticularly for input-based payments). Also, as small holdings are often intensively
farmed, land management changes may incur higher opportunity costs. Thus,
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compared to larger farms smallholders may require more incentive per unit area of
land to participate in a scheme, whilst total transaction costs will rise with the
number of holdings; more so if costs of veriﬁcation of agreement compliance or
ES provision are high. Thus, ES buyers and/or their intermediary may have in-
centive to focus a limited budget on low cost ES providers and exclude others. For
example, by introducing scheme eligibility requirements that may disfavour
smallholders such as minimum areas or formal land titles. Such scenarios chal-
lenge an intermediary if scheme objectives require high participation rates to
achieve desired targeting and spatial coverage, or to meet social equity and de-
velopment goals. An intermediary may then need to be pro-active in scheme
design and operation to overcome barriers to participation and to reduce trans-
action costs per holding. This may require, for example, capacity to contract at
multiple farm scales, design of interventions that sustain income generation from
contracted areas, and substitution of other forms of security for formal land titles
(Bosselmann and Lund, 2013). Such abilities will again be enhanced by in-depth
knowledge of local conditions and trust between intermediary and ES providers.
Representation and mediation fall under scheme administration but merit de-
tailed consideration. As noted above, PES scheme intermediaries serve as agents
accountable to the interests of both ES providers and buyers. Often graced with the
term ‘honest broker’ (also ‘ethical broker’), the term makes a (positive) normative
assumption about their operation.14 Thus, in a developing country context in
particular (though not exclusively) the intermediary may seek to actively represent
the interests of disadvantaged and resource-poor ES providers in scheme devel-
opment (Corbera and Brown, 2008; Pham et al., 2010; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005),
and during operation support them (morally, legally and ﬁnancially) in holding ES
buyers to fulﬁl payment for services delivered. If there is potential for a PES buyer
to exercise monopsony power then an intermediary could also help coordinate
collective bargaining by ES providers to counter this (Smith, 2013).
An intermediary that achieves desired ES provider participation rates also
serves ES buyers if scale-dependent cost advantages (Cash, 2001) and outcomes
are gained. Coordinated participation by ES providers may be needed for the
scheme to gain critical mass, and in most cases land management changes that are
coherently targeted will achieve greater impact for water resource protection,
or other environmental goals, than those that are scattered and ad hoc15
14The Compact Oxford Dictionary deﬁnition is: ‘n. a mediator in international, industrial, etc.
disputes’, implying need for the role in response to an existing problem (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.).
15Similar concerns arise in relation to the need to develop coherent environmental ‘corridors’ to
conserve biodiversity and avoid scattered ‘conservation sprawl’.
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(Smith, 2013). An intermediary (preferable working in partnership with statutory
agencies) also represents the interests of ES buyers by assessing compliance by ES
providers with existing regulation so as to achieve ‘additionality’ in response to
scheme payments, and with the terms of the PES agreement. This can mitigate
concerns that payments may ‘reward polluters’ compared to land users already
applying good practice, and reassure an ES buyer of value for money gained.
Monitoring and regulation are difﬁcult and costly in rural areas and regular en-
gagement with farmers by a trusted intermediary can substitute (to a given extent)
and be cost effective (Smith et al., 2017). Finally, an intermediary may engage in
representing the worth of a scheme to a wider public and to policy makers.
With regard to knowledge generation and exchange, it was noted above that
information is central to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and
hence to transaction costs and efﬁciency of outcomes. An intermediary must
marshal information between ES providers, who may signal high opportunity costs
to negotiate a higher price, and ES buyers who signal a low willingness to pay or
seek to exert monopsony power. Information rents arising can be reduced by
sharing information about both parties and through mechanisms such as auctions.
Provision of interpreted information to ES providers and buyers reduces their
exposure to risks and transaction costs, and develops the trust and local institutions
needed for scheme development (Pham et al., 2010). Poor access to information
will adversely affect ES provider recruitment in particular, and an intermediary
will likely serve as an important local information hub (Bosselmann and Lund,
2013). It may also exert inﬂuence to enhance the enabling political and policy
environment for scheme development and operation. Boundary concepts and
objects may be employed to assist all concerned actors to be able to differentiate
normative opinions from fact and to clarify the scope, scale and severity of a
problem and the merits of alternative solutions. Once more the intermediary role
will clearly be enhanced by knowledge of local conditions and by experience of
similar activities.
The ‘social capital framework’ asserts that trust, norms of reciprocity and
horizontal networks can reinforce each other and together foster cooperation be-
tween stakeholders including ofﬁcials (Sabatier et al., 2005). An effective inter-
mediary must build and hold the trust of all actors, deﬁned in terms of conﬁdence
that people or organisations will keep their promises, treat others fairly, and show
concern for others’ welfare (Sabatier et al., 2005). The functions and performance
of a PES intermediary can be enhanced by social capital (Pham et al., 2010;
Perrot-Maître, 2006), and indeed, adoption of PES as an approach is more likely
where civil society organisations and their associated social capital pre-exist and
can facilitate trust between ES providers and buyers (Adhikari and Agrawal,
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2013). However, PES intermediaries have also been criticised in some cases for
their share of the costs of a scheme, contributing to distrust between ES providers,
intermediaries and buyers, and hence they should seek to establish transparency
over both their role and the beneﬁts the scheme is generating for ES providers and
buyers (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
In conclusion, Table 2 provides a challenging list for any single agency, though
as noted it is expected that an intermediary should be able to address many of these
roles in partnership with other private, public and civil society actors, including ES
buyers and other organisations representing ES providers. All of this requires
conscious design and iterative implementation of arrangements and procedures.
Complexity and locational speciﬁcity denies application of a ‘one size ﬁts all’
template and PES implementation must be painstakingly constructed from expe-
rience elsewhere, the requirements of the PES buyer(s) and knowledge of local
needs, conditions and actors. Intermediaries have critical roles to play in PES
schemes and these must be well understood prior to developing a programme,
preferably so as to align with and build from existing organisational capacities and
a more or less enabling institutional and policy environment, and supporting actor
landscape. Another uncertainty is the difﬁcult question of who regulates the ‘ﬁeld’
of the intermediary and the criteria to be used for selection of such an agency by a
public or private scheme ﬁnancier. A diversity of organisations, governmental and
non-governmental, have facilitated development and operation of PES schemes
(Porras et al., 2008), but Trust Funds and local and international NGOs are ob-
served to be the most common forms of intermediary. The private sector has not
generally provided the intermediary function, though Davis et al. (2015), cite
exceptions from northwest Montana, USA.
Further concerns in the literature relate to the quality of an intermediary’s work
including the extent of genuine and effective stakeholder engagement and par-
ticipation, and political inﬂuences on their activities and hence neutral status
(Pham et al., 2010; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). This emphasises a need for
economic and political neutrality and independence. There may also be dangers of
local capture by elites or interest groups. This could extend to inclusion of only a
sub-set of land users when ‘piggy-backing’ PES development on pre-existing
activities. The original purpose for which a local institution was established to-
gether with the local polical economy may condition its portfolio of activities and
networks, and therefore inﬂuence targeting of PES. Thus, choice of a local in-
termediary on grounds of cost efﬁciency could reinforce existing inequalities in
access to resources rather than promote general inclusiveness (Bosselmann and
Lund, 2013).
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A Developed Economy Case Study: The Upstream Thinking
Project in Southwest England
As noted above, the majority of PES intermediary case studies in the literature
draw from developing economy examples. This section describes an innovative
example from a developed economy that has had long standing policies for agri-
environmental objectives. In this summary (and in the following concluding
section), identiﬁable overarching roles and key functions performed by the case
study intermediary are cross-referenced (with reference to the numbering in the
table) to the generic categorisation provided in Table 2.
In southwest England intensive livestock and dairy farms can be a major source
of diffuse water pollution in rural areas; the main pollutants being sediment,
nutrients and faecal organisms. Developed to protect and improve raw water
resources at source, the ‘UpStream Thinking’ project (UST) aims to use improved
farm infrastructure and land management practices to enhance raw water quality
and manage water ﬂows before they reach water treatment works and supply to
water users (Upstream Thinking, n.d.). The project was co-developed by a private
water supply company, South West Water (SWW), and an environmental charity,
the Westcountry Rivers Trust (WRT)16 (Table 2, Role A, functions 1–12); an
example of an intermediary acting as a co-innovator and initiator of change.
Until recently, the water industry in the UK has tended to rely solely on costly
water treatment solutions to treat poor quality raw water. It is now well-recog-
nised, however, that land use measures can help manage surface run-off and
mitigate water pollution, and thus reduce the treatment costs required to meet safe
drinking water standards. Reduced treatment implies reduced use of chemicals and
energy, and reduced emissions. The associated reduction in costs could also help
to limit future increases in water bills for water consumers. As part of integrated
catchment management, measures taken may also enhance adaptation to climate
change and the resilience of regional water resource management in terms of
managing drought and ﬂood risk (examples of public goods). In assessing its
economic beneﬁts, SWW predicted that UST could delay or even avoid the need
for investment to upgrade water treatment works. This provided sufﬁcient incen-
tive for SWW to invest in the project but additional beneﬁts potentially extend
beyond regulatory compliance with drinking water standards and include
16WRT (Charity no. 1135007, Company no. 06545646) was established in 1995 with the aim of
securing the preservation, protection, development and improvement of the rivers, streams, water-
courses and water impoundments in the Westcountry and to advance the education of the public in
the management of water (The Rivers Trust, 2017a).
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improving habitat and biodiversity, contributing to EU Water Framework Direc-
tive compliance, improving carbon sequestration and at least partially mitigating
ﬂood risk (further public goods).
The project represents genuine innovation by the privatised water industry in
partnership with an environmental charity. Such innovation ﬁrst required the
prevailing policy environment to become more enabling (of great importance as
noted above). This occurred through a departure from strict economic regulation
by the government’s industry regulating body,17 which from 2010 for the ﬁrst time
allowed capital investment by a water company on third-party land. UST has since
achieved national recognition as a model to be potentially replicated and has
gained several industry awards (Smith, 2013). In co-developing the project, SWW
recognised the economic, ecological and regulatory beneﬁt of improved raw water
quality and was prepared to invest in provision of ecosystem services within the
water catchments from which it abstracts, whilst WRT proactively engaged with
SWW to develop an approach and fungible project (Table 2, Role A, functions 1–
12). As an environmental charity with more than 15 years of experience working
in the region, WRT could offer itself as an intermediary for the development and
operationalisation of PES based on its knowledge of the catchment-wide actions
that could be provided by farmers to improve water quality and of the farms and
farmers located there (an example of the potential beneﬁts of an intermediary’s
in-depth knowledge of local conditions as considered above).
In the scheme payments to farmers are based on action through investment in
improved farm infrastructure and agricultural practice. Longevity of agreements
and commitment by farmers are ensured through a 10 or 25 year contract (based on
the economic life of farm infrastructure improvements) and attached restrictive
covenants that specify conditions for improved farm infrastructure usage and
speciﬁc land management practices (Table 2, Role A, function 7). There can be no
guarantee under current legal provisions (Smith et al., 2012) that environmental
goods can be delivered permanently on small private farms, but SWW is enabled
under the current regulatory regime to undertake investment appraisal over a
30 year horizon including a commitment to sustaining farming families. Farm
infrastructure investments are co-ﬁnanced by SWW and the farmer, usually on a
50/50 basis. Transaction costs are signiﬁcant as each farm agreement is unique
and time consuming to prepare (Table 2, Role A, functions 7, 10, 11). WRT also
provides technical assistance with infrastructure improvement design and local
17The regulator is known as “Ofwat” or the Water Services Regulation Authority and is a non-
ministerial government department established in 1989 when the water and sewerage industry in
England and Wales was privatised.
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planning applications as required (Table 2, Role A, function 9; Role B, functions 2
and 3).
WRT’s strategy for the project depends upon a collaborative approach which
sees landowners informed and assisted in the protection of river catchments as part
of an integrated approach to good land management. Tailored one-to-one advice
and farm plans that focus on both the environment and the objectives of the farm
business are supported by the SWW ﬁnanced capital grant scheme. These elements
of the project delivered by WRT represent an investment of approximately
GBP 2.75 million over ﬁve years across four target catchments in South West
England.18 There are also parallel initiatives funded by SWW and delivered with
other partners that focus on the restoration of wetted peat moorlands in upland
areas of the catchments concerned and restoration of ﬂoodplain wetlands. As an
intermediary WRT seeks to ‘mix and match’ funding sources to achieve its mis-
sion (Table 2, Role C, function 7). Hence for example, the clean water objectives
of UST can be complemented by biodiversity objectives achieved through sup-
porting farmers in their access to the national CS scheme for measures that, for
example, beneﬁt bird habitats.
WRT’s active public dissemination,19 communications to policy makers, and
application of the ‘Ecosystem Approach’ (CBD, 2016) and a PES paradigm which
places it as an ‘ethical broker’ between water company (and its customers) and
farmers, provide examples of boundary concepts in practice (Table 2, Role A,
functions 2 and 3; Role B, functions 1, 7–10; Role C, functions 2 and 6; Role D,
functions 1, 3–6; Role E, functions 1, 3 and 4). A particular exemplar is provided
in Fig. 1. This graphic depicts to the right of the river as viewed, a farmed
landscape improved by adoption of best practice measures funded at least in part
by PES schemes to produce food and other multiple ecosystem services, in sharp
contrast to the unimproved conditions depicted to the left of the river. This ‘good
versus bad farm’ image has become nationally well known in the relevant pro-
fessional and policy communities and emblematic for the work of the rivers trusts
movement (Table 2, Role C, function 6).
As examples of boundary objects, modelling and GIS-based tools are used to
identify and target problem areas, for example, for soil loss and diffuse pollution, and
areas most beneﬁcial for ecological restoration (Table 2, Role A, functions 4–6).
18The Upper Tamar, Roadford Reservoir, Upper Fowey and Wimbleball. WRT was also instru-
mental in securing funds from both EU and UK sources to fund the WATER project, aimed at
developing PES potential and guidance (WATER, 2015).
19 In partnership with The Rivers Trust, a national ‘umbrella’ body for the UK’s rivers trust
movement.
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Holistic assessment and planning are used with the aim to ensure multiple beneﬁts
for stakeholders and the regional economy (Table 2, Role C, function 5). Planning
is approached spatially, through the adoption of ‘aspirational maps,’ that display a
range of land uses and land management scenarios. These might focus on water
quality (for habitat and consumption purposes), on habitat conservation and en-
hancement, on carbon sequestration, or on recreation. Mapping involves the uti-
lisation of environmental information in ‘intelligent catchment design’ using
weighted GIS overlays (Cook et al., 2014), comprising a clean and fresh water
ecological layer, a clean and fresh drinking water layer, water regulation for
ﬂooding, water regulation for drought, a climate layer (greenhouse gas regulation
and air quality) recreation and tourism and provision of habitat. Such spatial
modelling indicates that approximately 6% of the catchment area comprises
‘hotspots’ where land use in intensive agriculture conﬂicts to the greatest extent
with conservation. Instrumental measures may be targeted at wetlands and land in
intensive grazing, at limiting ﬂooding, attenuation of sedimentation, reduction of
diffuse pollution, reduction of pathogen loading, improving carbon storage
capacity, improving low biodiversity and increasing habitat provision (Table 2,
Role A, function 5). The mix of approaches includes assisting farms to meet
Source: Westcountry Rivers Trust.
Fig. 1. ‘Good farm versus bad farm’, a depiction of feasible change and ecosystem service provision
in a farmed landscape.
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regulatory requirements, beneﬁt from time and cost-saving ‘win-wins’, and gain
PES incentives in the form of capital grants for farm infrastructure improvements
from the UST project, or when other funding won from the EU, UK government,
other foundations or private sector permits (Table 2, Role A, function 9; Role B,
functions 1 and 3; Role C, functions 2 and 5).
Examples of boundary work in reconciling the needs and priorities of the
science, policy and practitioner communities are also provided by the UST ex-
ample. For scheme design, this was addressed through a series of stakeholder
meetings involving farmers, SWW and WRT as intermediary, supported by aca-
demic researchers (Table 2, Role A, functions 3 and 10; Role B, functions 1, 7–9;
Role E, function 1). These meetings provided opportunities to identify knowledge
gaps and uncertainties, recognise technical, policy and practical constraints, and
collaboratively develop solutions and further research priorities. Facilitated de-
liberation and collaboration among stakeholders allowed decision makers to in-
tegrate science with local knowledge and beneﬁt from processes of social learning
(Table 2, Role D, function 7). For a wider public including SWW’s customers and
regional and national policy makers, both WRT and SWW have invested in
communications and outreach activities through workshops with stakeholders,
presentations at conferences and other fora, public outreach and a range of web-
based and other communication media (Table 2, Role A, function 3; Role C,
function 6; Role D, functions 3 to 6; Role E, functions 1 and 3).
Case Study Evaluation
The UST project provides an example of a PES scheme co-developed by a private
water company and an environmental charity. SWW could translate the regulatory,
economic and ecological beneﬁts of improved raw water quality into assets for the
company balance sheet, a modest increase in water customer bills and investment
in ES provision. WRT had knowledge of the measures that could be taken by
farmers to improve water quality, technical capabilities for catchment-scale as-
sessment, planning and farm advice delivery, and trusted acceptance as an inter-
mediary based on working relationships with the farming community established
over 20 years (Table 2, Roles A, B and E). Despite the signiﬁcant transaction
costs of scheme operation and the costs of on-farm measures shared with farmers,
the project is proving to be a cost-effective means for SWW to protect its raw
water resources (CaBA, 2016). A beneﬁt-cost ratio of 65:1 has been calculated for
the project based on the beneﬁts of deferred investment in water treatment
plant upgrades alone (Smith, 2013). In addition, the scheme is expected to
deliver savings in the operational expenditure of existing water treatment plants
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(SWW, 2016). These ﬁnancial beneﬁts for South West Water and its customers
could not be achieved without the intermediary functions performed by WRT,20
(Ross, 2012, personal communication).
The vision of the scheme extends, however, beyond ﬁnancial returns alone. The
following summarises the views of Bright21 (personal communication, 2012) who
characterised PES as exempliﬁed by the UST project as:
(i) ‘Bioregional planning’, a holistic approach to catchment management
underpinned by sound economics;
(ii) community conservation, employing local leadership and support to achieve
‘win-win’ situations;
(iii) payment via a market mechanism, signiﬁcant funding for ES provision from
the beneﬁciaries of environmental gain (e.g. water consumers);
(iv) working to engage the public, through conservation and resource protection
based in ‘enlightened self-interest’ such that stakeholders are incentivised and
not just regulated.
As PES scheme development is to date very limited in the UK, with virtually no
mature examples available for analysis of actor roles, the UST and work of WRT
provide a valuable exception. While organisations from any sector can potentially
perform the intermediary functions identiﬁed (Section: “Roles for PES
intermediaries” above, and Table 2), the need for trust in and acceptance by both
ES providers and buyers, for wider public and policy maker acceptance, and for
independence and ﬂexibility makes a case for the virtues of the value driven, not-
for-proﬁt and politically neutral voluntary sector (Couldrick,22 2012 personal
communication). It can thus be argued that the UK’s environmental charitable
sector is potentially well ‘equipped’ for the PES intermediary role. This is rein-
forced by regulation by the Charity Commission23 that ensures that a charity’s
foundation and operation are reported, accountable and for public beneﬁt.24
Charities are generally trusted by the public, seen as performing important roles
and effective in bringing about change, and trusted to work independently (Ipsos
MORI, 2014). Conservation voluntarism in the UK has a long tradition and we
20Mr. Martin Ross, former Environmental Manager, SWW and interview respondent.
21Dr. Dylan Bright (1972–2016), CEO of WRT (2008–2013), co-originator of the UST project and
interview respondent.
22Dr. Laurence Couldrick, CEO of WRT, interview respondent.
23For England and Wales.
24A charity’s purpose “must be beneﬁcial” (and any detriment or harm that results from the purpose
must not outweigh the beneﬁt) and “beneﬁt the public in general, or a sufﬁcient section of the public”
(Charity Commission, 2016).
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-23
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
observe that it is expanding in scope and functionality from advocacy and its own
actions into partnership working and acceptance of delegated responsibilities
within decentralised and polycentric governance. Participation of Rivers Trusts
and other environmental charities in the national Catchment-Based Approach
(Defra, 2013) provides a leading example of this. However, we also observe that
formal status, mechanisms for local and higher accountability and relationships
between conservation NGOs, elected bodies and designated ‘competent authori-
ties’ can remain unclear. Gaps and uncertainties in ﬁnancing, and competition in
labour markets with agencies and private sector, are also issues that may affect
continuity of delivery (Cook and Inman, 2012).
As a functional example, we observe that the Rivers Trusts movement draws
inspiration and purpose from both the national conservation ethos and regulatory
provision for charities. Its adoption of the Ecosystems Approach is well matched
with a strong ethic for holistic and inclusive catchment management, while its
modus operandi is to seek multiple funding sources, partnerships and to fully
engage with stakeholders (The Rivers Trust, 2017b). Government approval and
encouragement is increasingly signalled in England, again not least via the leading
role played by Rivers Trusts (and other environmental NGOs) in the hosting and
development of Catchment Partnerships as part of the national Catchment-Based
Approach (Defra, 2013).
We also observe that identiﬁable strengths in the UST case to date include: trust
building through the employment of an intermediary organisation that is locally
based and sympathetic to goals of local farm businesses; the development of a
long-term participatory process to identify alternative water protection measures
and a mutually acceptable set of incentives; and the ability to design and deliver
incentives well-matched to land tenure and farm debt cycle issues. The WRT has
been working in the region for 20 years and has the local knowledge and expertise
necessary for this coordination and targeting, whilst its farm advisors have built up
a high degree of trust and acceptance amongst the farming community (West-
country Rivers Trust, 2017). We conclude that this trust and associated social
capital has proved essential for the development and implementation of UST and
in reducing the transaction costs of project implementation.
We acknowledge, however, that charities have to be self-promoting to function
and arguably with this an element of self-criticism may be lost. As for other
organisations their role as intermediaries will be conditioned by their values, and
their original founding purpose and mission could inﬂuence their targeting ap-
proach, or bias them against alternatives. Hence, independent evaluation and the
presence of statutory agencies including Ofwat and the national EA are important.
Another potential weakness is that as small and independent NGOs their funding is
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usually project-based, tending to suffer from ‘boom and bust delivery’ and so
making it difﬁcult to sustain delivery of all desired plans and activities (Couldrick,
personal communication, 2016). In this context, UST is something of a ‘double-
edged sword’ for WRT. Its ﬁnancing enables them to pursue their mission through
innovative and effective means, but WRT remains wary of becoming beholden to
SWW as paymaster rather than partner, as the scale of the UST project has grown
in relation to the charity’s other ﬁnancing and activities (Couldrick, personal
communication, 2016). In England and Wales, we observe that a private water
company is a prime consumer of ecosystem services, but through abstraction and
wastewater discharges can also negatively impact the environment. This raises the
question of whether the PES scheme partnership and funding arrangements can
marginalise the water company’s ability to be held to account by that intermediary.
In this example, WRT reduce this risk by building consensus rather than exposure
and lobbying, and by ensuring no one funder accounts for more than 50% of their
active delivery activities (Couldrick, 2016, personal communication).
Final Conclusions
In generic terms, although management of transaction costs is central (Section:
‘Roles for PES Intermediaries’ above, and Table 2), intermediary performance
should also be evaluated in the context of broader factors including the difﬁculty of
the situation, multiple and possibly conﬂicting scheme goals, political and policy
inﬂuence and the existing institutional and actor landscape (Bosselmann and Lund,
2013; Huber-Stearns et al., 2013). It is important to consider the locations in which
the organisation operates, the purpose for which it was established, the networks of
farmers and other land users afﬁliated with the organisation, and pre-existing
operations which may enable cost savings through overlay of a PES approach.
Such factors should be identiﬁed and considered when a PES intermediary role is
outsourced to an organisation (Bosselmann and Lund, 2013).
Multiple objectives are particularly challenging. The potential trade-off between
efﬁciency of budget allocation and other objectives such as inclusion of the rural
poor and poverty alleviation is highlighted in the literature (e.g. Mayrand and
Paquin, 2004; Corbera and Brown, 2008). A successful intermediary must develop
ways to mitigate this trade-off and secure desired environmental outcomes at
affordable cost (Vatn, 2010; Bosselmann and Lund, 2013). In UK, priority may be
given to environmental objectives, and for UST speciﬁcally to raw water quality,
although WRT is committed to providing other environmental services whilst also
sustaining the rural economy and local farming communities (The Rivers Trust,
2017a). High farmer participation rates in target areas are also necessary to reduce
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risks of water contamination to acceptable levels commensurate with SWWs ca-
pabilities for monitoring, rapid response water treatment and if necessary water
blending from different sources (Ross, 2012, personal communication).
As considered in the introduction to this paper, a PES scheme for water
resources protection will be best established as part of a hierarchy of comple-
mentary policy approaches and as part of a holistic and adaptive approach to
ICM. Collective action is thus required in the form of polycentric and multi-level
collaborations between organisations (Smith et al., 2015). Key factors to achieve
this are a permissive and enabling policy and regulatory environment with dele-
gation of authority for action from higher levels of government to regionally and
locally based authorities and organisations (Smith et al., 2015). From our synthesis
of observation and lessons from the literature (Table 2), we conclude that a key
role is also played by intermediaries or boundary organisations in achieving the
necessary “vertical” integration and “horizontal” coordination of authorities and
actions. In UST horizontal coordination is provided by the WRT and vertical
integration is achieved by the assumption of responsibility for action to protect
water quality in the environment beyond its own property boundaries by SWW,
working in partnership with, and with the regulatory approval and support of
Ofwat and the EA. We observe that in the relevant literature such governance
arrangements are rarely adequately identiﬁed, or analysed in terms of the required
institutions and reciprocity of actions and agreement for their functionality. Within
the river catchments of southwest England, and particularly in the Tamar system
which is heavily exploited by SWW for water supply, we conclude that WRT’s
operation as a PES intermediary has so far maintained neutrality, independence,
ﬂexibility and cost-effective capability for delivery of water quality focused PES
and other ICM interventions. It can be concluded that WRT’s organisational form,
legal status and capabilities have enabled it to match the characteristics and
functions required of an intermediary in this context. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
its operation has been cited as an exemplar of ‘good practice’ in terms of non-
hierarchical, inclusive governance (Inman, 2005; House of Lords, 2012).
Acknowledgements
Assistance was provided by the Westcountry Rivers Trust and South West Water.
Research informing the conception and content of this paper was undertaken under
a Research Project Award from the Rural Economy and Land Use Programme
(RELU), a collaboration between the United Kingdom’s Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC), the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research
Council (BBSRC) and the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).
H. Cook, L. Couldrick & L. Smith
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-26
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Additional funding of the RELU programme was provided by the Scottish Gov-
ernment and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Comments
on earlier versions of the paper by an anonymous reviewer are also gratefully
acknowledged.
References
Adhikari, B and A Agrawal (2013). Understanding the social and ecological outcomes of
PES projects: A review and an analysis. Conservation and Society, 11(4), 359–374.
Agrawala, S, K Broad and DH Guston (2001). Integrating climate forecasts and societal
decision making: Challenges to an emergent boundary organization. Science, Tech-
nology & Human Values, 26(4), 454–477.
Arrow, KJ (1991). The economics of agency. In Principals and Agents: The Structure of
Business, JW Pratt and RJ Zeckhauser (eds.), pp. 37–51. Boston: Harvard Business
School Press.
Asquith, N, MT Vargas and S Wunder (2008). Selling two environmental services: In-kind
payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia. Ecological
Economics, 65, 675–684.
BBC (2015). River health revealed in ‘shocking’ ﬁgures. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-32074953 [accessed 30 June 2015].
Benson, D, A Jordan, H Cook, A Inman and L Smith (2013). Collaborative environmental
governance: Are watershed partnerships swimming or are they sinking? Land Use
Policy, 30, 748–757.
Boissin, D (2009). Boundary organizations: An efﬁcient structure for managing knowl-
edge in decision-making under uncertainty. Paper prepared for 113th EAAE Seminar
‘The Role of Knowledge, Innovation and Human Capital in Multifunctional Agriculture
and Territorial Rural Development’. Belgrade, Republic of Serbia.
Bosselmann, AS and JF Lund (2013). Do intermediary institutions promote inclusiveness
in PES programs? The case of Costa Rica. Geoforum, 49, 50–60.
Ca, BA (2016). Upstream Thinking. Available at: https://www.catchmentbasedapproach.
org/deliver/upstream-thinking [accessed 9 February 2017].
Cash, DW (2001). In order to aid in diffusing useful and practical information: Agricul-
tural extension and boundary organizations. Science, Technology & Human Values, 26
(4), 431–453.
Cash, DW, WC Clark, F Alcock, NM Dickson, N Eckley, DH Guston, J Jäger and RB
Mitchell (2003). Knowledge systems for sustainable development. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 100(14), 8086–8091.
CBD (2016). Ecosystem Approach. Conventional on Biological Diversity, Available at:
https://www.cbd.int/ecosystem/ [accessed 23 December 2016].
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-27
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
CEC (2000). Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23
October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
Policy. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.
Charity Commission (2016). What makes a ‘charity’. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/what-makes-a-charity-cc4 [accessed 21 December 2016].
Cook, HF, D Benson and A Inman (2014). Partnering for success in England: The
Westcountry Rivers Trust. In The Politics of River Basin Organizations, D Huitema,
S Meijerink and S Verduijn (eds.), pp. 119–139. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Cook, H and A Inman (2012). The voluntary sector and conservation for England:
Achievements, expanding roles and uncertain future. Journal of Environmental Man-
agement, 112, 170–177.
Corbera, E and K Brown (2008). Building institutions to trade ecosystem services: Mar-
keting forest carbon in Mexico. World Development, 36, 1956–1979.
Crona, BI and JN Parker (2012). Learning in support of governance: Theories, methods,
and a framework to assess how bridging organizations contribute to adaptive resource
governance. Ecology and Society, 17(1), 32.
Davis, EJ, L Gwin, C Moseley, H Gosnell and H Burright (2015). Beer, beef, and boards:
The role of intermediaries in payment for ecosystem services arrangements in north-
western Montana. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 58(9), 1562–
1576.
Defra (2013). Evaluation of the Catchment Based Approach Pilot Stage, Final Evaluation
Report, London: Defra.
Defra and The Rivers Trust (2012). Defra Strategic Evidence and Partnership Project.
London: Defra and The Rivers Trust.
Ecosystems Knowledge Network (2016). Defra payments for ecosystem services pilot
projects. Available at: http://ecosystemsknowledge.net/resources/programmes/pes-
pilots [accessed 31 March 2016].
EFRA (2016). Future ﬂood prevention. Second Report of Session 2016–17, House of
Commons, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee. House of Commons,
HC115, published 2/11/16.
Engel, S, S Pagiola and S Wunder (2008). Designing payments for environmental services
in theory and practice: An overview of the issues. Ecological Economics, 65(4),
663–674.
Environment Agency (2015). Water Framework Directive Classiﬁcation (2014). Progress
Update, Gov.UK, Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/water-
framework-directive-classiﬁcation-2013-progress-update [accessed 30 July 2015].
Gintis, H, S Bowles, R Boyd and E Fehr (2003). Explaining altruistic behavior in humans.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 153–172.
Gov.UK (2016). Countryside Stewardship: Statements of priorities, Available at: https://
www.gov.uk/government/collections/countryside-stewardship-statements-of-priorities
[accessed 17 May 2016].
H. Cook, L. Couldrick & L. Smith
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-28
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Greiber, T (ed.) (2009). Payments for Ecosystem Services. Legal and Institutional
Frameworks. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
Grieg-Gran, M, I Porras and S Wunder (2005). How can market mechanisms for forest
environmental services help the poor? Preliminary lessons from Latin America. World
Development, 33, 1511–1527.
Guston, DH (2001). Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: An
introduction. Science, Technology & Human Values, 26(4), 399–408.
House of Lords (2012). A template for catchment management. Available at: http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldeucom/296/29618.htm [accessed 30
July 2015].
Huber-Stearns, HR, JH Goldstein and EA Duke (2013). Intermediary roles and payments
for ecosystem services: A typology and program feasibility application in Panama.
Ecosystem Services, 6, 104–116.
Inman, A (2005). Tackling Diffuse Pollution of Water from Agriculture — the West-
country Rivers Trust, UK. Waterlines, 24(1), 4–5.
Ipsos MORI (2014). Public Trust and Conﬁdence in Charities 2014. Charity Commission.
London: Ipsos MORI.
Jensen, MC and WH Meckling (1976). Theory of the ﬁrm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Kemkes, RJ, J Farley and CJ Koliba (2010). Determining when payments are an effective
policy approach to ecosystem service provision. Ecological Economics, 69, 2069–2074.
Landell-Mills, N and I Porras (2002). Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? A Global Review of
Markets for Forest Environmental Services and their Impact on the Poor. London: IIED.
Lidskog, R (2014). Representing and regulating nature: Boundary organisations, portable
representations, and the science–policy interface. Environmental Politics, 23(4), 670–
687.
Mayrand, K and M Paquin (2004). Payments for environmental services: A survey and
assessment of current schemes. Montreal: Unisféra, Commission for Environmental
Cooperation of North America.
McCann, L, B Colby, KW Easter, A Kasterine and KV Kuperan (2005). Transaction
cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies. Ecological Economics, 52,
527–542.
Mollinga, P (2013). Boundary concepts for the interdisciplinary analysis of irrigation
water management in South Asia. In Controlling the Water: Matching Technology and
Institutions in Irrigation and Water Management in India and Nepal, D Roth and L
Vincent (eds.), pp. 342–365. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Muradian, R, E Corbera, U Pascual, N Kosoy and PH May (2010). Reconciling theory and
practice: An alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for envi-
ronmental services. Ecological Economics, 69(6), 1202–1208.
Newell Price, JP, D Harris, M Taylor, JR Williams, SG Anthony, D Duethmann, RD
Gooday, EI Lord, BJ Chambers, DR Chadwick and TH Misselbrook (2011). An In-
ventory of Mitigation Methods and Guide to their Effects on Diffuse Water Pollution,
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-29
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Ammonia Emissions from Agriculture. Defra Project
WQ0106, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Ostrom, E (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E (1999). Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework. In Theories of the Policy Process, PA Sabatier
(ed.). Bouder CO: Westview Press.
Oxford Dictionaries (n.d). Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/
english/prejudice [accessed 30 June 2015].
Patton, MQ (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. Thousand Oaks CA:
Sage.
Perrot-Maître, D (2006). The Vittel payments for ecosystem services: A “perfect” PES
case? London: IIED.
Pham, TT, BM Campbell, ST Garnett, H Aslin and MH Hoang (2010). Importance and
impacts of intermediary boundary organizations in facilitating payment for environ-
mental services in Vietnam. Environmental Conservation, 37(1), 64–72.
Porras, I, M Grieg-Gran and N Neves (2008). All That Glitters: A Review of Payments for
Watershed Services in Developing Countires. Natural Resource Issues No. 11. London:
IIED.
Rittel, H and M Webber (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Science,
4, 55–169.
Rørstad, PK, A Vatn and V Kvakkestad (2007). Why do transaction costs of agricultural
policies vary? Agricultural Economics, 36, 1–11.
RPA (2016). Basic Payments Scheme: Rules for 2016. Rural Payments Agency, GOV.
UK. [accessed 10 December 2016].
Sabatier, PA, WD Leach, M Lubell and NW Pelkey (2005). Theoretical frameworks
explaining partnership success. In Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To
Watershed Management, PA Sabatier, W Focht, M Lubell, Z Trachtenberg, A Vedlitz
and M Matlock (eds.), pp. 173–199. Cambridge, MA: MIP Press.
Salzman, J (2009). A Policy Maker’s Guide to Designing Payments for Ecosystem Ser-
vices. Duke University School of Law, Paper 2081. Durham, NC.
Smith, L (2013). The United Kingdom case study: Payments for ecosystem services (PES)
and collective action — ‘Upstream Thinking in the South West of England’. In
Providing Agri-environmental Public Goods through Collective Action, OECD (ed.).
Paris: OECD Publishing.
Smith, L and KS Porter (2010). Management of catchments for the protection of water
resources: Drawing on the New York City Watershed experience. Regional Environ-
mental Change, 10(4), 311–326.
Smith, L, A Inman and R Cherrington (2012). The potential of land conservation agree-
ments for protection of water resources. Environmental Science and Policy, 24, 92–100.
H. Cook, L. Couldrick & L. Smith
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-30
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Smith, M, D de Groot, D Perrot-Maître and G Bergkamp (2006). Pay — Establishing
Payments for Watershed Services. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
Smith, L, KS Porter, D Benson and K Hiscock (2015). Conclusions and Future Chal-
lenges. In Catchment and River Basin Management: Integrating Science and Gover-
nance, LED Smith, KS Porter, K Hiscock, MJ Porter and D Benson (eds.). Abingdon:
Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, Routledge.
Smith, S, P Rowcroft, M Everard, L Couldrick, M Reed, H Rogers, T Quick, C Eves and
C White (2013). Payments for Ecosystem Services: A Best Practice Guide. London:
Defra.
Smith, L, A Inman, L Xin, Z Haifang, F Meng, J Zhou, S Burke, C Rahn, G Siciliano,
P Haygarth, J Bellarby and B Surridge (2017). Mitigation of diffuse water pollution
from agriculture in England and China, and the scope for policy transfer. Land Use
Policy, 61, 208–219.
Star, SL and JR Griesemer (1989). Institutional ecology, ‘translations,’ and boundary
objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology,
1907–1939. Social Studies of Science, 19, 387–420.
Strauss, A and J Corbin (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures
for Developing Grounded Theory, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
SWW (2016). South West Water Limited Annual Report and Financial Statements 2015/
16. southwestwater.co.uk.
The Rivers Trust (2017a). Westcountry Rivers Trust. Available at: http://www.ther-
iverstrust.org/riverstrusts/wrt.html [accessed 4 January 2017].
The Rivers Trust (2017b). About the Rivers Trust. Available at: http://www.theriverstrust.
org/about/index.html [accessed 9 February 2017].
Upstream Thinking (n.d.). Upstream Thinking. Available at: http://www.exmoormires.org.
uk/index.cfm?articleid=8692 [accessed 30 May 2016].
URS-Scott, Wilson (2011). Barriers and Opportunities to the Use of Payments for
Ecosystem Services. London: Defra.
USEPA (2008). Handbook for Developing Watershed Plans to Restore and Protect Our
Waters. EPA 841-B-08-002. Washington DC: Environmental Protection Agency.
Vatn, A (2010). An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services.
Ecological Economics, 69(6), 1245–1252.
Voulvoulis, N, KD Arpon and T Giakoumis (2017). The EU Water Framework Directive:
From great expectations to problems with implementation. Science of the Total Envi-
ronment, 575, 358–366.
WATER (2015). Water project: Wetted Land: The Assessment, Techniques & Economics
of Restoration. Available at: http://projectwater.eu/index.html [accessed 30 July 2015].
Westcountry Rivers Trust (2017), Meet our team. Available at: http://wrt.org.uk/about-us/
team/ [accessed 9 February 2017].
Wunder, S (2005). Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and bolts. Center for
International Forestry Research Occasional Paper No. 42. Bogor: CIFOR.
Assessment of Intermediary Roles in PES Schemes
May 2, 2017 10:31:23am WSPC/154-JEAPM 1750003 ISSN: 1464-3332
1750003-31
J. 
En
v.
 A
ss
m
t. 
Po
l. 
M
gm
t. 
20
17
.1
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LO
N
D
O
N
 o
n 
05
/0
5/
17
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
